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TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY FOR THE OIL &
GAS INDUSTRY

Charles C. Steincamp

Environmental Liability Developments for Oil and Gas Operators
Charles C. Steincamp
Depew and Gillen L.L.C., Wichita, Kansas

Introduction
Although there are a myriad o f environmental laws that may affect oil and gas operations,
by far the most significant are those enacted at the federal level. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
are the most sweeping. While the Clean W ater Act and the Oil Pollution Act impose liability for
spills o f petroleum both require a connection to waters o f the United States and are therefore
more limited in application. This paper will focus on the liability provisions o f these acts as it
relates to pollution issues affecting the oil and gas industry and discuss some o f the recent trends
which may affect the industry. In addition, the recent ruling o f the 11th Circuit requiring a permit
under the Safe Drinking W ater Act for hydraulic fracturing o f producing formations will be
discussed.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was first enacted in 1976 as part o f the
Solid Waste Disposal Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. It’s focus was originally to regulate waste
disposal. It was significantly amended in 1984 in the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
which added a number o f requirements regarding the management o f hazardous waste. The Act’s
guiding impetus is to avoid prospective problems associated with the disposal o f hazardous waste.

When approaching a situation involving RCRA, the first question is what is a hazardous
waste. Because RCRA was enacted as part o f the Solid Waste Disposal Act, to be a hazardous
waste a substance must first fit the definition o f a solid waste. However, that requirement usually
gives little comfort. First o f all, “solid” waste does not have to be solid. In fact, RCRA defines
“solid waste” to be “[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations, and from community activities...” The U.S.E.P.A. defines “discarded
material to be any material which is “abandoned,” “recycled,” or which is considered “inherently
wastelike.” 40 CFR § 261.2(a)(2). Abandoned is further defined to include materials that are
“disposed of,” “burned or incinerated” or “ accumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled)
before or in lieu of being abandoned by doing disposed of, burned or incinerated.” 40 CFR §
261.2(b). Finally, RCRA defines disposal to include both active and passive releases o f waste by
“The discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing o f any solid or hazardous
waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent
thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters,
including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).

Once a material has been determined to be a solid waste a determination is made whether
or not it is hazardous. RCRA defines hazardous waste to include those substances which because
o f its “quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause, or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase o f serious irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible illness or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health

or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed. EPA is charged with identifying characteristics of hazardous waste and listing
hazardous waste. Therefore there are two methods for determining whether a material is a
hazardous waste: test the waste to see if it exhibits the characteristics o f hazardous waste; or
determine if it or one o f its constituents appears on an EPA list o f hazardous waste.

Fortunately for the domestic oil industry, Congress has decided that it is better to tax it to
death rather than regulate it out of existence. Congress has exempted many o f the wastes created
during the exploration process from treatment as a hazardous waste. “Drilling fluids, produced
waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production o f crude oil
or natural gas or geothermal energy shall be subject only to existing State or Federal regulatory
programs in lieu o f this subchapter...” 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A).

Therefore, the domestic oil and gas industry has been spared enormous costs associated
with disposal o f hazardous wastes. The author recently was given a bid o f $.63 per pound for
disposal o f hazardous waste at an E.P.A. approved disposal site. However, as documented in the
recent CBS editorial piece by Ed Bradley “Town Under Siege”, even that exemption is under
attack by both the EPA and private groups. Even assuming that the exemption survives, that is
not the end o f the story. The Act also contains a “citizen suit” provision at 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(B) and a corresponding section providing a similar right o f action for the EPA. This
provision allows “any person” to bring a civil action against “any person” including “the past or
present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator o f a
treatment, storage or disposal facility, who has contributed or is contributing to the past or

present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal o f any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the
environment.”

Oil and Gas operations are protected from liability for hazardous waste disposal only to
the extent that the waste is related to drilling fluids and produced waters that come within the
terms of the exemption in the statute. Clearly, crude oil does not qualify for such an exemption,
nor does any o f the refined products created from crude oil production. All o f these substances
contain listed hazardous wastes such as benzene1, ethyl benzene, xylene among others. See

United Stales v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D.Mo. 1985). In addition,
many o f the normal oilfield chemicals are either listed or characteristic hazardous wastes which
would likewise not fit the exploration wastes exemption. Normally, both crude oil and refined
products are not within the purview of RCRA, however, when they are released, they are at a
minimum solid waste that RCRA requires be cleaned up. There is not an exception for petroleum
in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Zands v. Nelson, 34 E.R.C. 1561 (S.D. Cal. 1991).

The U.S. District Courts have the authority to order any person liable under the Act to
take any action that might be necessary, or to restrain any person from taking action to the extent
necessary to address the imminent and substantial endangerment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(l)(B)(2).
This can include an order to cease and desist from activities or an order to undertake a cleanup o f
a spill or release. In order to further create an incentive for private citizens to act as “private
attorney’s general” the statute further provides for an award o f the costs o f litigation including
1 Benzene is a class A human carcinogen.

attorney’s fees and expert witness fees to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e). A further
unnerving aspect o f RCRA citizen suit is that there is no statute o f limitations, an action may be
brought as long as there is an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment. M eghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 1251 (1996). The citizen suit provision
has been relatively little used to address oilfield contamination in the past however, it appears that
day is coming. There appears to be a dramatic upswing in reported decisions applying the RCRA
citizen suit to either oilfield waste or petroleum products. The American Bar Association has
noted that citizen suits have exploded in the 1990's. National Resources and Environment, Vol.
II, Number 4, Spring 1997.

There are a host of cases filed in federal court seeking an order requiring the cleanup o f
hazardous wastes resulting from the spill or release o f petroleum products. See Meghrig v. KFC

Western, Inc, supra; Morris v. Primetime Stores o f Kansas, Inc., 43 E.R.C. 1762 (D. Kan. 1996);
Zands v. Nelson, 34 E.R.C. 1561 (S.D. Cal. 1991); Buggsi Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. , 39
E.R.C. 1526 (D. Or. 1994); Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995); Williams Pipe Line

Co. v. Bayer Corp., 694 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997); U.S. v. Valentine, 38 E.R.C. 2086 (D.
Wy. 1994). Several cases have been decided to date concerning whether crude oil is a hazardous
substance requiring remediation. Highlights from only a few o f the cases are instructive. In the
case o f Nixon-Egli Equipment Co. v. John A. Alexander Co., 949 F. Supp. 1435 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
an action was brought under both RCRA and CERCLA (discussed below) for cleanup o f
hazardous substances on a former oil field in the City o f Santa Fe Springs, California. The field
was produced from the 1920's to the 1960's and after the wells had been plugged it was acquired
for commercial development by the defendants. Plaintiff leased the property for over 25 years and

finally purchased it outright. Expert opinion in the case established that at least one source o f the
hazardous substances at the site was crude oil. Because there is no shield from liability under
RCRA for crude oil contamination there were few defenses available to the defendant under that
act. The defendant argued that the last possible date o f pollution was in the 1960's and that the
statute of limitations had long run. The court gave short shrift to that argument holding that there
was no statute o f limitations under RCRA, as long as contamination was present, an action could
be maintained. The court denied the defendants motions for summary judgment and allowed the
case to proceed on both the RCRA and CERCLA claims.
Likewise in the case of U.S. v. Valentine, 38 E.R.C. 2090 (D. Wy. 1994), the U.S. E.P.A.
brought an action against Conoco Pipeline Company, Eighty-Eight Oil Company, Phillips
Petroleum Company and Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc. among others for cleanup, under
the corresponding federal provision of the RCRA citizen suit provision, o f a site which was used
for processing below grade crude oil. The facility received crude that was below the pipeline
standards and processed it into high quality crude. The facility was operated during the 1970's
and 1980's. In 1993, the E.P.A. issued an order to a number o f defendants requiring cleanup o f
the spilled oil waste, leaking tanks and saturated soils. The soils and oil waste contained benzene,
toluene, ethyl benzene and xylene, which are all hazardous substances indigenous to crude oil.
Conoco, Texaco, Phillips, Eighty-Eight and True settled with E.P.A., agreeing to joint and
severally conduct a cleanup estimated to cost between $4.4 and $8.9 million. In addition, the
settling defendants agreed to pay $300,000 in civil penalties. The non-settling defendants were
held liable for contribution and additional civil penalties and injunctive relief as well as fines under
the Endangered Species Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.

The Nixon-Egli case illustrates the point, crude oil contains hazardous substances and as
urban sprawl takes in more and more areas that have formerly been operated as oilfields there will
be increasing numbers o f actions filed seeking cleanups o f oilfield contamination. The focus will
tend to be less in areas that are developed as residential real estate, simply because there is a
smaller focus on the environmental condition o f the property prior to development. However,
that creates a further problem. Because these problems are not likely to be discovered until later,
the risk maybe even greater. By the time anyone realizes the situation, there will be playgrounds
built in contaminated areas, basements set down in contaminated soil, wells for watering lawns
spraying contaminated groundwater. Therefore, instead o f mere claims for cleanup, there may be
additional toxic tort claims raised against the former operator o f the wells that caused the
contamination.

Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
CERCLA was first enacted in 1980 as part o f Congress’ knee-jerk response to three well
known hazardous waste sites: The Valley of the Drums, Love Canal, and Times Beach. The Act
is also known as the “Superfund” due to the fund created from taxes on oil and chemicals that can
be used by EPA to cleanup contaminated sites which have become known as “Superfund sites.”
The Act has become associated with extreme levels o f waste and inefficiency. In fact, cleanups
now average above $30 million per site with a substantial percentage o f those costs going to
administrative costs and litigation.

Liability under CERCLA is based upon a party’s connection to either the waste or the real
property on which it is located. Liable parties include current “owners or operators o f the vessel

or facility” as well as “owners or operators at the time o f disposal”; any person who generated the
hazardous substance; any person who arranged for disposal, treatment or transportation o f a
hazardous substance and any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
disposal and selected the site o f disposal. These parties are known as Potentially Responsible
Parties (PRP’s).

While RCRA is a prospective statute, CERCLA is retrospective. It is designed to provide
for cleanup o f sites which are no longer active and have essentially been abandoned, however,
because of the extremely broad language o f the act, its applicability has few limits. CERCLA also
requires the reporting of a release of any hazardous substance with fines o f up $250,000 and
imprisonment o f up to 3 years for a first offense. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b),(c). EPA is granted the
authority to order that either a removal or a remedial action be taken by a PRP. 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
Should a PRP fail to implement the ordered remedy, punitive damages o f up to three times the
amount of costs actually incurred may be assessed against the noncompliant party. United States
v. Parsons, 738 F. Supp. 1436 (N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd 936 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1991)(PRP held
liable for three times the actual cleanup costs o f $753,391.24 for failure to provide ordered
response). “Hazardous substances” are defined to include all hazardous substances designated
pursuant to RCRA, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and an extensive list designated
pursuant to CERCLA itself.

However, once again the Oil and Gas industry has been spared the economic carnage that
was created by CERCLA. The act contains a “petroleum exclusion.” This specifically excludes
from the definition o f hazardous substance “petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof

which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance... and the term
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas useable for
fuel (or mixtures o f natural gas and such synthetic gas).” As can be imagined this has been an
incredibly fortuitous provision for oil and gas operators. However, because the oil industry is
seen as a deep pocket, there has been continuing attempts to erode the protections provided by
the petroleum exclusion. These efforts have been successful in limiting the exclusion severely,
and in some jurisdictions the exclusion has been largely circumvented. The decisions are legion
which hold that the petroleum exclusion does not apply to hazardous substances that are added to
or mixed with the petroleum product during or after use. See Bunger v. Hartman , 797 F. SUPP.
968 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Niecko v. Emro Marketing Company, 769 F. SUPP. 973 (E.D. Mich.
1991); Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Corporation, 881 F.2d 801, 805 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 761 F. SUPP. 713 (W.D. Wa. 1991);

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corporation, 755 F. SUPP. 531, 539 (N.D. N.Y. 1991); New
York v. Exxon Corporation, 744 F. SUPP. 474, 489-90 (S.D. N.Y. 1990); Washington v. Time
Oil Company, 687 F. SUPP. 529, 531-32 (W.D. Wa. 1988).

There are two cases that are of particular note to the Oil and Gas Industry. The first is the
case o f Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 37 E.R.C. 1153 (9th Cir. 1993). In that case Getty Oil had
disposed o f tank bottoms from crude oil into what was known as the “Gravel Pit” near its
pumping station in Tracy, California. After the Tracy facility was closed in 1968, Getty eventually
leveled the gravel pit with topsoil and sold the 40 acre tract on which the “Gravel Pit” was located
to Don Cose in 1974. Mr. Cose began to develop the property for residential housing in 1987
and in the process discovered a “subsurface asphalt or tar-like material” on the property. A

consultant confirmed that the tar-like substance contained 10.5 parts per million o f Chrysene, a
known carcinogen. The crude oil in the region was found to contain chrysene at 28.0 ppm.
Based on the results o f the consultants study, Cose filed suit under CERCLA to recover response
costs for cleaning up the Gravel Pit property.

Getty filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Cose could not prove that
they had disposed o f a “hazardous substance” within the meaning o f CERCLA. The district court
granted the motion and Cose appealed to the 9th Circuit. After an exhaustive review o f existing
case law, legislative history, and EPA guidance, the 9th Circuit concluded that the petroleum
exclusion did not apply. The Court reasoned that the crude oil tank bottoms are clearly “waste
materials.” Getty disposed o f the tank bottoms with no intention o f recycling them. Further, the
court found that the tank bottoms are not “petroleum or any fraction thereof’ because they are
not petroleum at all. Crude oil tank bottoms are merely comprised o f water and suspended solids
that settle out o f crude oil and collect at the bottom o f crude oil storage tanks en route to
refineries. Therefore, the court found that since the presence o f Chrysene at the site was
undisputed, Getty was liable for the cleanup costs at the site as a matter o f law.

The next case which focuses on liability for oil production that deserves mention is the

Nixon-Egli case discussed above with regard to RCRA liability. In that case contamination was
found on the site o f an old oilfield. The plaintiffs brought an action under both RCRA and
CERCLA as well as various State law causes o f action. The plaintiffs consultant had concluded
that the main source o f contamination was crude oil. But the lead, the main hazardous substance
at the site, was not solely from the crude oil. Following the reasoning in Cose the court found

that drilling by-products such as the drilling cuttings and the drilling mud would not fall within the
petroleum exclusion. Therefore, if the lead at the site came from the crude oil, it would fall within
the petroleum exclusion and would not be a hazardous substance under CERCLA. However if
the lead was not from a petroleum source, it was a hazardous substance and could form the basis
for CERCLA liability.

It is clear from an examination o f the case law that oil and gas operators are on the horns
o f a dilemma. The combination o f RCRA and CERCLA essentially avoids any protection
afforded to oil and gas operators by the terms o f either statute. While drilling fluids and
production wastes may not be a hazardous waste under RCRA, they can form the basis for
CERCLA liability. At the same time while petroleum may be excluded from CERCLA liability, it
contains hazardous substances that require remediation under RCRA. Obviously, when these
laws are used in concert, there is no safe harbor. Since the enactment o f these laws environmental
groups and courts have focused on non-petroleum type wastes, however, the case law seems to
indicate that the honeymoon is coming to an end.

The question remains what can be done to avoid the massive liability from these two acts?
The best answer is two fold: first, a concerted effort should be made to use legal structures that
insulate the principals in any oil and gas venture from personal liability. The oil industry has long
operated on oral agreements and general partnerships, even on multi-million dollar prospects.
That day is coming to an end. Second, the industry must become proactive. Look before you
leap. Whether buying existing production or taking a new lease it is important to pay careful
attention to the environmental condition of the property. It is also important to respond quickly

in the event a spill or leak occurs. Clean up the mess when it happens rather than ignoring it and
waiting until the problem is far worse. The cost savings can be enormous over waiting until a
governmental agency forces a clean up or a letter arrives from an attorney representing parties
affected by the pollution.

Safe Drinking Water Act
Another alarming development for the oil and gas industry is the recent case o f Legal

Environmental Assistance Foundation v. E.P.A., 45 E.R.C. 1033 (11th Cir. 1997). LEAF filed
an action for review o f a ruling by E.P.A. denying their request to withdraw approval o f the
Alabama UIC (Underground Injection Control) program. UIC programs in the States are
required by Part C of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Act requires that E.P.A. promulgate
regulations establishing minimum standards for State UIC programs. States must then submit to
E.P.A. their proposed regulatory program to receive approval to regulate underground injection
activities within the State. Among the minimum requirements is that the State must prohibit any
“underground injection unless authorized by permit or rule.” 45 C.F.R. § 145.11(a)(5).
Underground injection is defined to be “the subsurface emplacement o f fluids by well injection.”
42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(l).
Alabama has extensive reserves of coal-bed methane. However, to produce the methane
at an economic rate it is necessary to hydraulically fracture the reservoir to increase permeability.
Guar gel, nitrogen or carbon dioxide gases, gelled oil, diesel oil, sodium hydroxide, sulfuric acid
and fumaric acids are used as fracture fluids. After the wells are fractured the fluids are pumped
out to start the flow of the methane gas. However, the Court found that 20-30% o f the fluid
remains in the formation. Hydraulic fracturing is not regulated under the Alabama UIC program.

EPA argued that their interpretation o f the statute was that it only required regulation o f
wells whose “principal function is the injection o f fluids into the ground.” The Court held that the
statute was clear that all underground injection is regulated under the statute. The only issue was
whether the activity falls within the definition o f underground injection. Using the statutory
language the Court found that hydraulic fracturing precisely fit the definition. Clearly, fracturing
involves injection o f fluids into the subsurface. Therefore the Court granted LEAF’S petition for
withdrawal o f the Alabama UIC program approval.
The effect o f this decision cannot be overstated. Hydraulic fracturing is an extremely
common well stimulation technique. The prospect o f obtaining a UIC permit each time a well is
hydraulically fractured is daunting. Anyone familiar with the process will realize that it is
extremely time consuming to obtain such a permit. A new permit requirement will no doubt
paralyze the industry. EPA realizing that fact has asked for reconsideration o f the Courts
decision, and vows to appeal. However, the prospects are not good. The most realistic chance o f
relief will have to come from Congress.
The future appears ominous for oil and gas operations within the continental United
States. The Oil industry has largely escaped the environmental slaughterhouse so far, however,
recent judicial decisions and the Ed Bradley Special Report that aired recently indicate that the
environmental movement is beginning to focus on the industry. The time is now to be proactive
both in avoiding or eliminating environmental problems and also in convincing legislators that
further liability and regulation will destroy the domestic oil and gas industry. To quote a recent
citizen suit plaintiff, if you violate any requirement o f an environmental permit “you are toast.”

